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Editor’s Desk:
As Vladimir Putin approaches the constitutionally-mandated end of his presidency, the 
issue of succession, or lack thereof, dominates the discussion within and about Russia. 
The instability inherent in a change in leadership has been highlighted recently by 
turmoil and splits among the siloviki closest to the president and stands in marked 
contrast to the stability from chaos that Putin claims as the hallmark of his presidency.
    
However, the current situation in Russia’s prisons is as much a legacy of Putin’s rule as 
the alleged order he has brought to Russian political and economic life.  The swelling of 
the prison population, the increase in the number of political prisoners, and even the 
resurgence of psychiatric confinement as a means of silencing individuals for political 
and/or criminal gain are stains on Putin’s presidency.   
Over the years, Lev Ponomarev has revealed worrisome phenomena, notably in the 
fight for civil rights in the Soviet era, in the valiant efforts to create viable democratic 
parties, and in the case of atrocities in Chechnya.  We are privileged to publish his 
analysis of the Russian penitentiary system under Putin in the hope that sunlight indeed 
will prove to be the best disinfectant.
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REVIVAL OF THE GULAG?
PUTIN’S PENITENTIARY SYSTEM
By Lev Ponomarev
Russia is attempting to demonstrate that it has fulfilled the demands of the European 
Court of Human Rights (which has acknowledged that conditions of detention and 
confinement can constitute torture, for example in the case of “Kalashnikov v. Russia,” 
Case Application No. 47095\99, 15 July 2002) by making the work of the Federal 
Service for the Enforcement of Punishments of the Russian Federation (FSIN RF, 
successor to the Main Directorate for the Enforcement of Punishments, which was 
known as GUIN) more transparent and more in line with modern European 
humanitarian criteria.
Despite these efforts, there remains significant contradictory evidence on the status of 
Russia’s penal system, such as the fact that a legislative bill on prison visitation has not 
been able to obtain a passing vote in the Russian State Duma for several years; 
Russian bureaucrats (chinovniki) happily visit Western countries and “study” at 
organizations that concern themselves with prisoners’ rights to visitation, yet the prison 
administration is becoming ever more opaque and inhumane.
A “Potemkin village” policy is in practice, allowing visitors to the prisons to view several 
“model” penal colonies. Access to “torture colonies” (also known as press-zones, 
described in greater detail below) by human rights advocates and even Justice Ministry 
employees is completely cut off.  In order for ombudsmen to visit detention centers 
without special permission, it would be necessary to amend Article 24 of the Criminal 
Code of the Russian Federation (UIK-RF).  The right to prison visitation will not be 
acknowledged until Article 24 is amended.
Some improvements to the situation in Russian prisons and penal colonies were 
achieved several years ago, due to a broad series of amnesties, which shortened many 
inmates’ sentences, as well as an increase in funding for the penal system.  However, 
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these improvements are proving temporary and fleeting, as the number of prisoners 
once again is growing, and the number of those who are amnestied or pardoned is 
shrinking, while prison sentences become ever harsher, in the framework of an all-out 
war on “criminal ideology.”
Materials obtained by human rights advocates indicate that in recent years a 
fundamental change has occurred in the Federal Service for the Enforcement of 
Punishment of the Russian Federation (FSIN RF, formerly GUIN), which, since 1992 
has been headed by General Yuri Kalinin.  The FSIN system has slipped away from 
public and even law enforcement control almost entirely and increasingly bears the 
hallmarks of a repressive camp system of the totalitarian type.  Consequently, 
considering the high level of lawlessness and violence inherent in Russia’s penal 
system, it is frequently compared to the Soviet-era GULAG.
According to official data as of 1 May 2007, 888,100 people are incarcerated in penal 
facilities, giving Russia the second largest prison population in the world.  Included in 
this number are 709,900 inmates held in 766 penal colonies; 165,900 people held in 
216 pre-trial detention facilities, seven prisons and 160 other facilities that function 
under the jurisdiction of the pre-trial detention system; and 12,100 inmates held in 62 
juvenile corrections facilities.  There are 62,400 female inmates serving their sentences 
in penal colonies and the women’s colonies also include eleven children’s homes, 
occupied by 713 children. 
Those who find themselves remanded to a pre-trial detention center (SIZO) likely will be 
subjected to torturous conditions in overcrowded facilities, where there is a very real risk 
of contracting tuberculosis, HIV, hepatitis, or some other dangerous disease with far 
less than adequate medical care.  Even General Yuri Kalinin, chief of the Internal 
Services and since 1992 the permanent director of Russia’s prison system, repeatedly 
has acknowledged the brutal conditions in the SIZOs: “The conditions in our pre-trial 
detention centers can be classified as torture, according to international standards.  This 
is the deprivation of sleep, air, space.”  This statement of Kalinin’s is quoted in a report 
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by Yakov Gilinsky of St. Petersburg, a well-known Russian expert, doctor of juridical 
sciences, professor, and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Sociological 
Institute.
Although General Kalinin recognized the generally brutal nature of detention in a SIZO, 
he assigned responsibility for the situation exclusively to the actions of Russian police 
investigators and courts, who choose arrest as the most common means of crime 
prevention, and who, therefore, are to blame for the excessive overcrowding of the 
SIZO facilities.
This same report by Gilinsky notes the use of a wide range of physical and 
psychological torture methods to obtain testimony from those who have been arrested 
or detained during the course of an investigation.  The use of torture as the basis for an 
investigation is mentioned in many reports by both Russian and international human 
rights organizations, as well as in the reports of federal and regional human rights 
ombudsmen. The term “torture” is defined according to Article 1 of the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, to which Russia is a signatory and whose terms it is therefore obligated to 
follow.  The UN definition excludes pain or suffering, which occurs as the inherent or 
accidental result of lawful sanctions. The fact that in the various regions a “not guilty” 
verdict occurs on average in only one out of every two hundred criminal cases testifies 
to the likelihood that a detainee will end up in a penal colony, following his or her arrest.
Once a criminal offender has received a guilty verdict and is sent to serve his sentence 
in a penal colony or prison, he faces a high risk of being subjected to torturous 
conditions, direct violence, or persecution and humiliation by prison administrators or 
their protégés in the notorious “discipline and order” brigades (SDiPs, a formalized 
network of convicts who collaborate with prison authorities and are permitted to commit 
acts of violence against other inmates, and who are used by the authorities to obtain 
confessions from other prisoners).  Convicts also face the threat of extrajudicial transfer 
to conditions of much stricter confinement for a period of up to several months, to such 
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facilities as the PKT (facility containing cell-type units), the EPKT (a facility containing 
single cell-type units), the SUS ( a more restrictive, high security facility), or the PFRSI 
(facility used for pre-trial detention).  In spite of what the law dictates, prisoners may be 
sent to serve out their sentences great distances from their homes, as in the case of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev, and Mikhail Trepashkin, all of whom are from 
Moscow.  This practice creates considerable problems for an inmate’s family members 
and attorneys.
Prison inmates also can be sent to the so-called “press-zones” (sections of penal 
colonies or sometimes even entire penal colonies that serve as facilities for torture), 
which are used to break down detainees morally and psychologically.  According to 
monitoring data obtained by the human rights organizations, there are approximately 
forty of these press-zones.
Since it is common practice to house both ill and healthy inmates together, prisoners 
risk contracting a number of life threatening diseases, such as tuberculosis, HIV, and 
hepatitis.  There is little opportunity for a prisoner to receive qualified medical assistance 
or even the documents necessary for him to register as disabled and be granted a 
pension.
The dire situation in the corrections system creates constant grounds for new instances 
of non-violent mass protests by the inmates, although the FSIN RF categorically denies 
many aspects of the systematic human rights violations and institutional secrecy.
When human rights advocates succeed in initiating an investigation into complaints filed 
by prison inmates or their relatives, by exerting pressure on the prosecutor’s office 
(prokuratura) and on federal and regional ombudsmen, the complainants immediately 
are transferred to other penal colonies, or are forced to withdraw their complaints, often 
through the use of sadistic torture, severe beatings and threats.
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Despite heavy criticism levied at him by Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir 
Lukin, former Justice Minister and current General Prosecutor (prokurator) Yuri Chaika, 
as well as by a number of human rights organizations, General Kalinin retained his 
prison director post, even after he submitted his resignation.  Taking into account the 
realities of Russian politics, this indicates that Kalinin has influential protectors in the 
highest circles of the Kremlin.
It must be emphasized once again that nearly all previously existing channels for human 
rights advocates, experts from the Ombudsman’s Office on Human Rights, and even 
parliamentary deputies to visit prison inmates have been eliminated.  As a rule, they are 
permitted only to visit institutions that have no problems, and even then they have a 
very restricted itinerary: the library and the cafeteria.  Even Justice Ministry employees 
have been barred from visiting prisons and penal colonies.  On 16 January 2006, in 
telegram no. 10/1-50T, General Kalinin announced that members of the media could not 
be granted permission to film inside FSIN institutions by regional administrations, but 
“only with the agreement of the FSIN RF!”
As a result of the lack of oversight, FSIN officials have managed to establish a system 
of control over the prisons that is analogous only to totalitarian systems.  First and 
foremost, this has entailed the creation of the aforementioned press-zones or torture 
colonies, in order to obtain confessions (and other self-incriminations) from prisoners, 
as well as for “behavioral correction” (breaking inmates psychologically).  These press-
zones can be found in penal colonies in approximately twenty of Russia’s regions.  Yet 
another totalitarian innovation is the transformation of so-called “order and discipline” 
brigades (SDiPs) into detachments of “prison-servants” (identifiable by their red 
armbands), who are often employed to fill a role similar to that of the “capos” in the Nazi 
concentration camps, or like Kadyrov’s special forces (spetsnaz).  These SDiP brigades 
often are granted operational control over the other inmates, although, unlike the official 
prison guards, their activities are not regulated by law and therefore are not subject to 
punishment.
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Collaboration between prison administrators and crime bosses also has become a 
significant element in the “new GULAG,” with the aim of suppressing protests against 
the flagrant destruction of prison inmates’ rights (the events that occurred after the 
protests in L’gov in June/July 2005 serve as a typical example).  Thus, the FSIN 
leadership has succeeded in creating a perfect system of control over prison inmates 
via torture, carried out by the jailors, the “red armband” convicts, and the organized 
crime leaders (vory v zakone).
One must give special attention to the fact that even the threat of sending a suspect to 
an isolation cell (izoliator), which is known to be used as a press-zone, can be enough 
to convince the suspect to capitulate to a police investigator’s demands and sign 
evidentiary documents and testimony (even if they are self-incriminating).  The infamous 
events that took place in penal colonies IK-1 (in the village of Yagul, located in 
Udmurtiya’s Zav’ialovskii raion), IK-2 (in Ekaterinburg) and IK-3 (in the town of L’gov, 
located in Kurskii oblast’), where beatings suffered by prison inmates sparked protests 
by hundreds of prisoners on the night of 27 June 2005, serve as examples of this 
phenomenon.  The list of press-zones is vast and according to (incomplete) data, these 
types of facilities are concentrated in about twenty of Russia’s regions.
Letters and reports from prison inmates and their relatives give a detailed picture of the 
harsh treatment used in the press-zones.  Newly arrived inmates are told to join a 
“discipline and order” brigade (SDiP), and those who refuse find their lives transformed 
into hell: they are subjected to beatings and persecution, including rape and even 
murder at the hands of the red-armband capos, as well as illegal beatings and 
victimization from the prison administrators.  Another important issue is the fact that, 
although the court may sentence someone to serve out his/her time in one prison 
facility, inmates can be transferred for many months to various types of “internal 
prisons,” where the regime differs significantly from that of regular prison facilities.  In 
essence, this constitutes the imposition of a new sentence by an extra-judicial body.  
Even those detainees who have not yet been tried or found guilty (!) can be confined on 
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the grounds of penal colonies, thanks to a decree by President Yel’tsin in 1997 creating 
PFRSIs (pre-trial detention centers).
The worst examples of this extra-judicial means of exacerbating the conditions of an 
inmate’s prison sentence are limitless confinement to a ShIZO (a punishment and 
isolation cell, where the confinement period officially is limited to fifteen days, but can be 
repeated countless times), a PKT (a facility containing cell-type units, where 
confinement is not to exceed six months), the EPKT (a facility containing single cell-type 
units, where confinement is not to exceed twelve months without an investigation or 
court hearing), or to SUS barracks, which are subject to “special confinement 
conditions” (the confinement period here can last 2-3 years).  Prisoners placed in such 
extra-judicial “internal prisons” are strictly limited or completely deprived of the right to 
written correspondence and parcels, access to legal documents, and visits from family, 
friends, etc.
The regard for prisoners’ rights has deteriorated to such an extent that even in cases 
where the relatives of a mistreated prisoner have succeeded in arranging a meeting 
between the prisoner and an attorney or representatives of human rights organizations, 
authorities may intervene and prevent the meeting from occurring. The attorneys and 
human rights advocates often are not acquainted personally with the prisoner and 
therefore can be palmed off on an inmate “activist,” who solemnly will assure them that 
the prisoner has no complaints of any kind and does not wish to meet with the defense 
attorneys.  This is what happened when human rights advocates visited the Mordovia 
penal camps (which are located on the same site as the Dubrovlag penal camp of 
Stalin’s time), shortly after dozens of the camp’s inmates were beaten in March 2006.  
By the time the attorney and representatives from the office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman arrived to investigate the incident, the victims of the beatings had been 
hidden in a zindan (dungeon), a hole in the ground covered with planks, located 
underneath a shop.  Later, the prisoners were dispersed hastily to more remote regions.
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Human rights defenders also have received reports from inmates in penal colony IK-1 in 
the village of Yagul (located in the Zav’yalovskii raion of the Udmurtia Republic) about 
extremely inhuman and humiliating practices by prison administrators, such as beatings, 
confinement to ShIZOs for many months, and the dousing of prisoners with water from 
fire hoses in the winter.  Prisoners also are thrust headfirst into toilet bowls and have 
been forced to lick the floor; some inmates resort to swallowing pieces of wire and nails, 
in order to escape from these torture chambers.
One additional example of prisoners’ harsh treatment is in the testimony submitted on 
19 June 2006 by attorneys T.G. Akhmedov and E.L. Liptser, regarding the unusually 
harsh and completely unprovoked beatings of several prison inmates by Spetsnaz 
personnel in the Nizhneangarsk isolation facility for temporary confinement (IVS), which 
is located in Buryatiya’s Severobaikal’sk raion.  The beatings occurred after the 
prisoners had returned from a court hearing, which had been adjourned for a recess.
One more way in which prison inmates are used to exert pressure on each other is the 
conversion of penal colonies into “common zones,” by transferring inmates who have 
been convicted of serious crimes to lower level security penal colonies for “good 
behavior.”  Hoping to exploit the improved conditions of their confinement and be 
paroled, these transfer prisoners become pliant tools in the hands of prison 
administrators, who use them to pressure and persecute prisoners convicted of less 
serious crimes.  This phenomenon turns to fiction the concept that the penal colony 
settlements were created to be separate facilities from those that house inmates 
convicted of more serious offenses.  This method of victimizing inmates was revealed 
when human rights advocates examined the conditions in penal colony IK-13 in Nizhny 
Tagil, where attorney and political prisoner Mikhail Trepashkin is serving out his 
sentence.  This penal colony was created within the territory of an already existing, 
general regime (minimum security) colony; inmates sent there are deprived completely 
of their freedom, in violation of the sentences that have been handed down by the court.
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The situation in Kaliningrad oblast’s penal colony IK-13 provides insight into yet another 
torture practice.  According to the testimony of inmates and their relatives, regarding 
conditions on this new GULAG island: “The quality of medical care provided is such that 
it constitutes a genuine THREAT to life: a complete absence of medications, refusal to 
hospitalize ill inmates, no opportunity for medical examinations and a lack of specialized 
physicians, giving prison administrators the authority to reject medications sent to 
inmates by their family members, on the grounds that they were sent without a doctor’s 
prescription.  For years, inmates have been unable to undergo the physical examination 
by medical and social experts which is required in order to become registered as 
disabled.  An enormous number of inmates have become infected with tuberculosis, 
hepatitis and the HIV virus.”
A letter from prison inmate Vitaly Kniazev, a participant and victim of the L’gov incidents, 
who came from Komsomol’sk-na-Amur to address the Movement for Human Rights, 
serves as one example of a whole range of torture methods.  At the end of June 2005, 
in a penal colony near the small village of L’gov in Kurskii oblast’, approximately 
400-600 prison inmates inflicted injuries on themselves as a protest against the harsh 
treatment to which they had been subjected by prison administrators, as well as by 
members of the “order and discipline” brigades (SDiPs).  A number of the inmates 
subsequently wrote appeals to the Prosecutor’s Office and to the Ombudsman on 
Human Rights in Russia, Vladimir Lukin.  These incidents gained worldwide attention, 
and the Prosecutor’s Office was forced to launch a criminal investigation not only of the 
prisoners who were involved, but also of those penal colony authorities who participated 
personally in the beating of prison inmate Alexei Shatunov (it was the beating of 
Shatunov and others that sparked the inmates’ protest actions).  Kniazev appealed to 
the European Court of Human Rights and, despite being subjected to brutal torture (he 
was burned with an electric kettle), threats, and pressure from the corrections officers, 
he did not retract his allegations.  The only other inmate who submitted an appeal to 
Strasbourg, Aleksei Shatunov, who also was the only acknowledged victim of the penal 
colony authorities’ actions, withdrew his complaint.
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The following exchange of opinions at a 15 January 2007 meeting between Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and human rights advocates testifies to the universally 
recognized nature of the systematic violation of human rights in the penal colonies, 
particularly the creation of convict brigades, such as the SDiPs, by the prison 
administration: 
[Transcript excerpt]
V. Borshchev (Valerii Vasil’evich Borshchev, an expert from the Office of the 
Ombudsman on Human Rights in the Russian Federation and President of the Social 
Partnership Fund): “…in the last two and half years a breakdown has occurred.  The 
corrections system is becoming closed off.  Not so long ago, the penal colonies in 
Mordovia served as sites of our successful joint endeavors.  Today, they are closed to 
society.  Even the chairman of the Public Council under the head of the regional FSIN 
directorate, who also happens to be the former president of Mordovia and who is well-
known for his constructive attitude, is not permitted to visit the penal colony.  A shameful 
persecution of human rights advocates goes on there, as well as in other places.  The 
same type of closed system exists in Tatarstan, Nizhny Novgorod, in the Ural okrug, St. 
Petersburg, and in Moscow.  Deputy Director of FSIN Semeniuk did not permit a visit to 
the SIZO by members of the Moscow City Commission on Human Rights and its 
experts, which is a violation of Article 19 of the Corrections Code.  The system of mutual 
cooperation between the corrections system (UIS) and human rights advocates, which 
was developed over the course of many years and through mutual efforts, is being 
deliberately destroyed…Without public oversight, it is not possible to truly reform the 
corrections system, it is not possible to overcome the defects which are inherent in it.  
As one [parliamentary] deputy said, ‘Without public oversight, the system is drifting in 
the direction of the GULAG…’  Generally speaking, the problem of violence is extremely 
serious.  In November (2006) I was at a session of the UN Committee Against Torture 
and their assessment of our situation was considerably harsher than at the previous 
session, which took place  five years ago, and I was forced to hear many unflattering 
words.  Last year, in my capacity as chairman of the Public Council under the Ministry of 
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Justice, I visited the L’gov penal colony in Kurskii oblast’ where the protest actions had 
taken place and where several hundred people [prison inmates] had slashed their veins. 
There had been systematic beatings of the inmates both by corrections officers and by 
so-called ‘activists.’  I received 254 complaints.  Two problems stood out.  The first is 
that complaints regarding violations of legislation (zakonodatel’stvo) do not reach the 
proper addressee.  Moreover, according to the law, as is well-known, letters to the 
Prosecutor’s Office (Prokuratura) and to the Ombudsman do not need to be censored; 
of course, they are reviewed and the Human Rights Ombudsman receives a letter with 
a note attached stating that there are no complainants.  This review process persuades 
an inmate not to file a complaint.  It is clear that these negotiations are not conducted on 
a level playing field.  The second problem is the existence of so-called discipline and 
order brigades.  In violation of Article 11 of the Criminal Code, the members of this 
notorious militant group are given the administrative authority to keep order.  How they 
do this is clear.”
V. Abramkin (Valerii Fedorovich Abramkin, Chairman of the Criminal Justice Reform 
Assistance Fund): “…for some reason there has been an unexpected increase and over 
the last two years, the prison population has grown at a higher rate than the rate at 
which it is decreasing and this is quite deplorable.  Much also has been done to improve 
the situation: the level of funding has quadrupled and other measures have been taken 
in order to rescue ourselves from disgrace – from the investigative (pre-detention) jails, 
which have been called hell on earth. Now it seems as though everything is moving in 
the right direction and we are once again striving to catch up with America and once 
again are getting close.  At the same time, this other terrible thing is happening.  We 
noted that the corrections system, as it is called by its own personnel, is one of the most 
open, however, at this time, particularly over the last three years, this system has begun 
turning into one of the most closed and most impenetrable, even in comparison to the 
MVD, the Prosecutor’s Office (prokuratura), etc.  The most closed – however, if this is 
happening, then it may mean that they have something to hide.” (1)
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It is very important to point out that in Russia, political prisoners are considered criminal 
offenders, are confined together with the other criminals, and are subjected to all the 
same deprivations and persecutions, including those practiced by the inmates 
themselves, and those exercised by the prison administrators. This is precisely what the 
situation was just prior to the attacks on Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the false charges 
against Mikhail Trepashkin that violate the regime’s own laws.
According to data obtained by Russian human rights advocates, the approximate 
number of political prisoners is as high as several dozen, including scientists and 
academics who have been charged with “espionage” by the special services; Mikhail 
Trepashkin, the attorney for victims of the 1999 terrorist attacks; those who were 
involved in the YUKOS affair; members of radical, democratic opposition movements; 
and immigrants from the North Caucasus region, who have been falsely accused of 
terrorism and religious extremism.  Relatives of human rights advocates against whom 
criminal charges have been fabricated also can be added to the roster of politically-
motivated arrests.  A 22-year old student from Ufa, Alina Zhukova, daughter of well-
known human rights activist Bashkir Zhukov, recently fell victim to this type of political 
persecution.  With the help of a frightened provocateur, drugs were planted on her and 
she was arrested.  In spite of the fact that the provocateur later came forward on his 
own and testified in court as to what had really happened, Alina was sentenced to seven 
years in prison.
~~~
Note: 
(1) Excerpts of the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and human rights 
activists provided by author.
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